His story is similar to Christopher Hitchens: he comes with excellent Left credentials, completely understands why the Left criticised Western support of Saddam in the 1980's, but argues that it is the Left which changed its stripes and became hypocritical in its approach to the Iraq war and its aftermath.
This has puzzled me for some time. The anti-War Left feels vindicated over the issue of the justification for war. Fine, let's not quibble over the actual details, which they constantly misrepresent, and just assume for the sake of the argument that the decision to invade was a grave error, and even an immoral act. (This is just "for the sake of the argument" talk, remember.)
Second point: does any serious analyst anywhere in the world suggest that the withdrawal of coalition forces at any point up to and including now would have meant immediate greater stability in Iraq and the region? Not as far as I know.
The crux of the matter then is this: how does promoting a step that would now make the average Iraqi's position worse suddenly become defensible from the moral high ground that the Left supposedly occupies?
Cohen explains it this way:
There was too much emotional energy invested in opposing the war, too much justifiable horror at the chaos and too much justifiable anger that the talk of weapons of mass destruction turned out to be nonsense. The politically committed are like football fans. They support their side come what may and refuse to see any good in the opposing team. The liberal left bitterly opposed war, and their indifference afterwards was a natural consequence of the fury directed at Bush.
It is a fair argument, which I've heard many times, although I wince at the implied passivity. People don't just react to a crisis: they choose how they react. If a man walks down the street trying to pick a fight, you can judge those he confronts by how they respond. Do they hit back, run away or try to calm him down? The confrontation is not of their making, but they still have a choice, and what choice they make reveals their character and beliefs. If you insist on treating the reaction to the second Iraq war as a one-off that doesn't reveal a deeper sickness, I'll change the subject....
The anti-war movement disgraced itself not because it was against the war in Iraq, but because it could not oppose the counter-revolution once the war was over. A principled left that still had life in it and a liberalism that meant what it said might have remained ferociously critical of the American and British governments while offering support to Iraqis who wanted the freedoms they enjoyed.
Cohen argues that no such support was offered. (I note that those European countries which opposed the war might have grounds to argue that their troops' lives should not lost because of an error of the pro-War countries, but even so, have they tried to offer diplomatic or other assistance of any form between the regional powers?)The likelihood of success of the current "surge" is hotly debated, which is fair enough. (Even Hitchens seems fairly pessimistic about it.) I freely admit to not knowing enough to really be able to judge its chances of success; Bush's critics on this issue all appear to be armchair experts on counter-insurgency tactics. (That some retired Generals oppose it is far from conclusive; some of those still around must have given it support, and in a situation as politicised and unique as this one, dissenting voices even within the military are to be expected.)
If the surge fails, and the political process within Iraq is unable to rise above sectarianism, there will be a point in the future where the US will have to exit as gracefully as possible. But the problem Cohen writes about is the anti-War Left's immediate isolationism after the fall of the regime and continuing today. It is not a position that should be held with pride.
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