I do see, though, that there was recent pretty acrimonious debate between Sam Harris (no free will) and Daniel Dennett (there is free will, in a more limited way than most people might think, but it still exists in a useful and meaningful sense) which really covers much the same ground as Sabine Hossenfelder did at Backreaction. I haven't had time to read up on all of that. I would say, though, that atheists seem unusually touchy about their determinism being questioned.
Of the many things I thought questionable about the Backreaction post, I think I can immediately note the following:
a. given that physicists know that there is quite a way to go to understanding quantum physics and things like non-locality, possible retro-causation, and the nature and fate of information in the universe (black holes and information loss, for example), it seems pretty presumptuous to think that the state of play as currently understood is enough to write the final word on determinism and free will. (I know that Hossenfelder disputes this line of argument.)
b. Sabine writes (my emphasis):
It doesn’t matter if you start talking about chaos (which is deterministic), top-down causation (which doesn’t exist), or insist that we don’t know how consciousness really works (true but irrelevant).There's probably a definitional argument to be had here, but when I think of top-down causation I think of the matter of how peculiar it is that ideas that get transmitted between humans affect their decisions and moods. This seems pretty important when talking about free will and what it means, and I see that there have been recent symposiums devoted to the topic. (This one sponsored by the Templeton Foundation, who atheists dislike because they think it promotes mystery as a door to maintaining grounds for religion. I don't like it so much because it also turns out they give awards to crappy libertarian ideas such as opposing a carbon tax.)
Let's just say that I'm not convinced that dismissal of the concept of "top down causation" isn't, again, premature.
c. Sabine's criticism of psychological studies that look at the effect of not believing in free will may have some good points, but I still doubt that this is grounds for dismissing all study of the effects of this belief.
That's all, for now.