The killer is in the detail

This is a list of the "diplomacy" recommendations of the Iraq Study Group:

The United States should:

1. Begin a new diplomatic offensive to build an international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region. The effort should include every country that has an interest in avoiding a chaotic Iraq, including all of Iraq’s neighbors.
   
2. Try to engage Iran and Syria constructively, using incentives and disincentives.
   
3. Renew commitment to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace process, including President Bush’s commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine.

Iran should:

1. Stem the flow of arms and training to Iraq.
   
2. Respect Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
   
3. Use its influence over Iraqi Shiite groups to encourage national reconciliation.

Syria should:

1. Control its border with Iraq to stem the flow of funding, insurgents and terrorists in and out of Iraq.

International efforts:

1. The issue of Iran’s nuclear arms should be dealt with by the five members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany.
   
2. A possible regional conference on Iraq or broader Middle East peace issues.

The most interesting part is what "incentives and disincentives" could be used with Iran and Syria? I am assuming the Study Group would not consider Bush threatening military strikes a good idea, even though you get the feeling that such threats are the only kind that might make Iran and Syria act more cautiously.

Many, many commentators will make a similar point, I am sure. See this article in Slate for one.

Then this other article in Slate (which I only read after starting this post) does give more detail:

On Page 51, the authors acknowledge that the United States should offer Iran and Syria incentives, "much as it did successfully with Libya." But the Libyans had nothing to lose, and everything to gain, when they agreed to give up their nascent (and still very primitive) nuclear program. The Iranians, by contrast, have great wealth and enormous leverage, not only in the Middle East but with European and Asian countries that depend on their oil.

The authors do take a bold step here. They list a few "possible incentives" that Bush might offer Iran, among them "the prospect of a U.S. policy that emphasizes political and economic reforms instead of … regime change."

Well, I suspect that Iran feels pretty secure that a policy that wants regime chance can be resisted indefinitely. I mean, look at Iraq!

Meanwhile, I have said for some time that common sense indicates there is no hope of governing a country split along religious sectarian lines when the government allows either or both sides to maintain their own militia. I would have thought that little progress is going to be made until the government decides to disarm everyone, and in particular the "Mahdi army", either by negotiation or force.