There's a handy summary of what led to it, including opposition to the idea in Britain, in this review at TLS. Good to know that it was controversial in its day. For example:
And as news of opium seizures and rumours of war reached the British public, which previously had little knowledge of the business, a vocal movement against opium and conflict with China quickly mobilized. The strongest, and best-organized, opposition came from working-class activists and the Chartist reform movement, which recognized the parallels between opium use abroad and gin abuse at home as methods of capitalist control. After Elliot’s convoy opened fire on a fleet of Chinese war junks while repairing from Macao to Hong Kong – the preliminary battle of the Opium War – an editorial in The Charter condemned “this contemptible category of businessmen and politicians . . . who behave like thieves and bullies gloating over the prospects of the bloodshed”.
Some critics feared that Britain was risking its entire future trade for the vaguest, most impetuous goals, as national self-regard consumed long-term strategic thinking. Others focused on the military consequences of engaging the Chinese, warning that it wouldn’t be as easy an affair as pro-war advocates like Jardine had argued. Platt quotes the opinion of an English captain of the Hyderabad army, who conceded that in the short run a small British expedition could invade China, but “what then would be gained?” other than provoking the Qing dynasty into mobilizing its vast resources and turning itself into a formidable power against which “the combined nations of Europe would hardly compete”.
When Parliament finally took up the question of war in April 1840, those opposed to attacking China were scattered throughout the benches. Some, like the former Whig-turned-Tory MP James Graham, conjured the Sinomania of the eighteenth century, designating China a civilized part of the earth, where language, laws and feelings of pride had been transmitted without interruption for centuries, and whose people boasted “of their education, of their printing, of the civilisation, of their arts, all the conveniences and many of the luxuries of life existing there, when Europe was still sunk in barbarism, and when the light of knowledge was obscure in this western hemisphere”. From the other side, the Secretary at War and arch promoter of empire, Thomas Macaulay, countered that the Chinese were brutes slowing the inexorable tailwinds of History. Perhaps the most surprising intervention came from George Staunton, who as a young boy had accompanied Macartney’s ill-fated mission to China in 1793, during which he had spoken briefly with the Emperor. He was Britain’s leading Sinologist, and had done more than anyone to promote respectful opinions of China. But he was a patriot, too, and a great believer in British prestige, which, in the end, countermanded his Oriental sympathies. As he saw it, the Empire was held together by force of opinion, and any show of weakness in China could ripple out and distress the foundations of British rule in India. Lin’s provocations harmed British trade in China, he said, but they also challenged the imperium as a whole.
MPs voted 271 to 262 in favour of war, a “lukewarm” blessing in Platt’s words. The irony was that most of the Canton trades didn’t much care about the events of 1839, and the showdown between Lin and Elliot. They just wanted to be compensated for the opium they had lost, something Elliot promised the British government would see to. But there were those among them for whom British force served grander commercial aims, including free access to ports and the coastline, as well as favourable treaties that boosted trade. Jardine worked sub rosa to ensure that a war for reparations became a war that would crack China open to commerce.
Read the whole thing, though.
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