I don't think there has been as much written in the media about the centenary of the October Revolution as I expected.
There wasn't a bad interview with a couple of experts on Radio National last night - but I am not sure who's show it was on.
There was one Guardian column about it a few days ago, but I can't quickly find it again. I was sort of expecting that outlet to be overrun with quasi sympathetic articles , but it hasn't really happened.
I see that Henry Ergas has a column in The Australian: I doubt it's all that interesting. The Weekend OZ may well be full of conservatives decrying it: we shall see.
So I'm down to noting a very lengthy review of
Kotkin's two volume biography of Stalin in The New Yorker, which covers the Revolution succinctly, as well as Stalin's later actions, and it's a very good read.
One minor detail amuses, in the section which discusses signs early on that Stalin would become (shall we say) a problem:
They had had some intimations: they knew he could be rude, and they even
knew he could be psychologically cruel. During his Siberian exile, he
had briefly lived with Yakov (Yashka) Sverdlov, a fellow-Bolshevik and
later the titular head of the Soviet government, but the two broke up
house because Stalin refused to do the dishes and also because he had
acquired a dog and started calling him Yashka. “Of course for Sverdlov
that wasn’t pleasant,” Stalin later admitted. “He was Yashka and the dog
was Yashka.”
There are many bits of information in the review which I either didn't realise, or had forgotten when I last read a long review of a book on Russian history. For example, after a brief summary of the Terror of the late 30's..:
The numbers are hard to fathom. According to the best current estimates,
Stalin was responsible for between ten and twelve million peacetime
deaths, including victims of the famine. But the most hands-on period of
killing was the Terror of 1937 and 1938. At its height, fifteen hundred
people were being shot every day. Most of the victims were ordinary
citizens, caught up in a machine that was seeking to meet its quotas.
But the Communist Party, too, was devastated—in many provinces, first
secretaries, second secretaries, third secretaries all gone. Entire
editorial staffs were erased. The officer corps of the Army was
devastated. Five hundred of the top seven hundred and sixty-seven
commanders were arrested or executed; thirteen of the top fifteen
generals. “What great power has ever executed 90 percent of its top
military officers?” Kotkin asks. “What regime, in doing so, could expect
to survive?” Yet this one did.
there is this:
In addition to everything else the Terror did, it greatly weakened the
country’s international position. Stalin’s justified fear of the coming
war made this war only more likely. The French and the British,
contemplating a stand against Hitler over Czechoslovakia in 1938, did
not feel they could count on the now depleted Red Army. Worse still, the
Terror made Stalin an unacceptable ally for the British in 1939. Kotkin
shows that Stalin’s first choice in the months before the war was not
Hitler but Chamberlain. He sent detailed terms to Britain for a military
alliance. Chamberlain was not interested, and Kotkin, refusing the
benefits of hindsight, doesn’t blame him. Stalin had just murdered
hundreds of thousands of his own citizens, staged show trials of his
former comrades, and carried out purges of putative socialist allies in
Spain. Hitler would eventually overtake him, but as of 1939 Stalin had
killed more people by far. He was, as Kotkin says, “an exceedingly
awkward potential partner for the Western powers.”
I didn't know about the approaches to Chamberlain.
The 20th century had a lot going on, to put it mildly...