A decent summary of the situation in Afghanistan seems to be the one in The Economist, which notes:
The Taliban, thought to number no more than 200,000 soldiers, armed
mostly with equipment they have seized from their enemies, have taken
all of Afghanistan’s urban centres in little more than a week, generally
without much resistance (see map). The answer seems to be that what
they lacked in brawn, they made up for in brains, determination and
political shrewdness. For the past year, diplomats in Doha had hoped
that the Taliban could be compelled to negotiate with Mr Ghani’s
government to agree to some sort of power-sharing agreement. The
insurgents evidently realised it would be more profitable to negotiate
with Mr Ghani’s underlings, city-by-city, and thereby simply pull the
rug out from underneath him.
Hence in Herat, a jewel of a city near the
Iranian border, Ismail Khan, the warlord who took the city back from
the Taliban in 2001, after fighting for days, surrendered and was
filmed, in captivity, pleading for “a peaceful environment”. In
Kandahar, the city at the heart of Afghanistan’s southern breadbasket
and the birthplace of the original Taliban, the governor was pictured
handing over to his Taliban counterpart. In Jalalabad, in the east, the
Taliban marched in without firing a shot, after elders in the city
negotiated a surrender. Mazar-i-Sharif, a northern city which once
served as a bastion of anti-Taliban resistance in the 1990s, folded in
similar fashion.
In each case, the
militants have made wide-ranging promises, to “forgive” those who served
in the American-backed government, in exchange for surrender. In
Kandahar, former soldiers who surrendered have been issued with laisser passer
documents that they can show at Taliban checkpoints. There, throughout
Friday night the sound of gunfire echoed throughout the city. According
to residents, it was mostly fired in the air in celebration.
The Afghan army, for all its apparent strength, seems to have fallen to
what might be called Yossarian syndrome, after a character in Joseph
Heller’s second-world-war novel, “Catch 22”. Yossarian was asked what
would happen if everyone thought as he did that fighting was pointless,
and replied he would “be a damned fool to feel any other way, wouldn't
I?” Similarly, the Washington Post quoted one Afghan officer
explaining why his soldiers would not stop the Taliban: “Brother, if no
one else fights, why should I?” Afghan military morale was not helped by
the government's fiscal crisis, which has led to government staff and
troops missing pay for months.
What does the Taliban takeover mean? For all their promises to show mercy in victory, few among Afghanistan’s intellectual elite are reassured.
After the militants took Spin Boldak, a town on the Pakistani border
that was among the first to fall in late July, credible reports emerged
quickly afterwards of dozens of government supporters being massacred.
In Kandahar in late July, when the militants began to take the outskirts
of the city, they kidnapped Nazar Mohammad, a popular comedian, and
murdered him. Reports from Kandahar say that armed Taliban have been
going door to door seeking out people who worked for Western
governments. In recent weeks, thousands of refugees have collected in
Kabul’s parks. Hundreds have mobbed visa-processing centres, hoping for a
space in the last-minute evacuations being organised by Western powers.
The
Taliban’s political arm in Doha has claimed that they are no longer the
bloody theocrats who ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, when accused
criminals were publicly executed at Kabul’s football grounds, including
women who were stoned to death for adultery....
The big geopolitical question arising from this is what China will do. It's hardly going to be seen as a friend of Islam, given their massive attempt to end its influence in its own territory; but on the other hand, minerals and money. US News wrote:
At stake for
Beijing are agreements it has already secured from the Taliban not to
harbor inside Afghanistan any Islamic extremists with designs to wage
insurgencies in parts of western China, notably the restive Xinjiang
province – a promise that far exceeds anything the U.S. has been able to
extract with regard to the persistent threats of al-Qaida operatives
partnered with the Taliban.
Any
sort of stability in Afghanistan would also allow China to reap the
benefits of prior economic investments in the region, including mineral
rights in Afghanistan. Buried in the latest report
from the U.S. inspector general overseeing reconstruction in
Afghanistan was a little-noticed observation that China has dramatically
increased its economic interests in Afghanistan recently, encouraging
the completion of a road in the Wakhan Corridor – the sliver of land
connecting the two countries. It cited an Afghan Public Works Ministry
spokesperson who said, "China has expressed a huge interest for
investment in Afghanistan, particularly in the mining sector, and this
road will be good for that, too." The Taliban recently seized wide
swaths of that territory as part of an apparent campaign to control
Afghanistan's northern border crossings.
China also seeks stability in Afghanistan for the sake of regional
infrastructure projects it's already pursuing in neighboring Pakistan as
a part of similar investments globally known as the Belt and Road
Initiative.
I get the impression it will all end in tears.
Finally - I will repeat the observation I have made before: I don't understand how, in modern times, Islamic fundamentalist inspired leadership which is willing to rule on the basis of terrorising its own population retains any popularity at all. I don't understand these societies.