Let's kick off the week with something like a shower thought: the kind that is sometimes embarrassing to ask openly, because of the degree to which it can show the writer's unfamiliarity with aspects of philosophy.
But the question in the post title occurred to me this weekend when reading this short interview with Robert Sapolsky, who currently is the most prominent figure arguing that free will does not exist, and (to give him some credit) discussing the consequences of that view. (I think far too many people - like Sabine Hossenfelder - just shrug their shoulders about the real life consequences of the belief in no free will.)
Anyway, as I have mentioned before, when it comes to the free will argument, I keep on having difficulty with grasping how lack of free will copes with the concept of a mere idea that comes from outside a person changing a person's behaviour in reaction to that idea. The fact that a person can, for example, be given concepts that may help them climb out of depression seems to indicate that something ephemeral, like how they should analyse themselves and their present situation, does change a person internally because they have accepted the ephemeral idea is true.
The somewhat novel extension (to me, anyway) of that line of thinking that has occurred to me is this: "does the mere concept of free will and people's ability to believe in it mean that free will does indeed exist - much like the ontological proof for the existence of God."
Now, I certainly don't believe the ontological proof of God is convincing, but the idea that an idea can indeed change behaviour seems more plausibly like a possible proof that the idea itself is real.
Don't come back at me and say "of course believing in a false idea doesn't prove the false idea is true." Yeah, sure. I guess I would try to get around that obvious argument by saying this is an idea about reasoning and ideas themselves. Not about factual matters like (to use an example) "Trump won the last election", or for that matter "God is real".
A quick Google hasn't shown up an exact replication of my suggestion - but it would have to be likely someone has run at least something close to this argument before. (I have thought briefly about how similar it is to "I think therefore I am" - and I'm not sure that it's quite the same.)
I don't mind this guy's post on the whole subject of free will (who is he?), but I will have to keep looking.
3 comments:
With the possible exception of neutrinos nothing in this universe is free from causation. What do we even mean by *free* will? We know people's behavior can be manipulated, that contingencies can shape our decision making, that our level of understanding and knowledge can shape our thinking. So in what sense is our cognition completely free? If people want to believe in free will then they have to believe that our self and cognition exists in some ethereal realm divorced from the typical processes that govern everything in this universe.
On your last point: I find Karl Popper's 3 Worlds a satisfying way to consider this. I see from the Wiki summary of his position, it's not that he was arguing that the world of ideas is a Platonic realm - but I think he was arguing it is still important and real.
It may be that my whole resistance to "no free will" position is because of barely conscious recall of Popper's position in the book I read way back in the late 70's or early 80's.
I disagree with Popper. I think World 3 is in the Platonic realm. It is a principal reason I reject materialism. While not explicitly endorsing the claims I also have concerns that there might be some legitimacy to paranormal and reincarnation accounts.
I don't know Steve. I think too many scientists blindly accept materialism and are dogmatically opposed to any consideration of a Platonic realm. Popper may well have refuted the Platonic implications of World 3 precisely because he would have attracted criticism for that position. For example, Sheldrake was a respected biologist but after his supernatural oriented arguments he has been ridiculed, and IIRC even banned from Ted Talks.
The rejection of a Platonic realm is ironic given the attitude of physicists like Max Tegmark(Our Mathematical Universe) which argues for mathematical Platonism; a position which in the very least suggests mathematics structures existed prior to the Big Bang.
There are other issues here, mystical experiences that transform a person's philosophy and that human beings have behaviors that seem to mock evolutionary imperatives. Hence I can't entirely dismiss the possibility of free will existing but it is a very misleading concept because obviously our behavior is not entirely free. The concept is barren, it explains nothing about how we make our decisions. Broadly speaking, concepts like that are bad concepts.
My principle objection is standard fare in epistemology: define the term!
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