Do you remember that when same sex marriage was being debated in France in 2013 there were sizeable street protests? I see from this rather
fascinating piece in The Economist that it has only just gone through Germany's Parliament, and an Archbishop was able to make this (to my mind, quite reasonable) statement:
AS YOU might expect, Germany’s Catholic hierarchs were less than thrilled
when legislators voted on June 30th, by 393 votes to 226, to legalise
same-sex marriage. Archbishop Heiner Koch of Berlin was one of many top
clerics who voiced the church’s view that a distinction between civil
partnership, for gay couples, and marriage, for heterosexual ones, ought
to be kept. The decision to do away with it, he grumbled,
abandons
the differentiated perception of various forms of partnership in order
to stress the value of same-sex partnerships...Differentiation isn’t
discrimination, and same-sex cohabitation can be valued through other
institutional arrangements without opening up the legal institute of
marriage.
The article goes on to note the differences in conservative issues between the two countries:
The
very fact that German bishops insist they see some value in same-sex
partnerships (so long as they are not described as marriage) might be
surprising to an American who is accustomed to tooth-and-nail culture
wars.
In France, gay marriage became law in May 2013.
Street protests by social conservatives, including four huge rallies in
Paris within six months, failed to stop the change. But they made
history nonetheless, as unexpectedly large social and political
phenomena.
True to the movement’s name—Manif pour Tous (Protest for All)—the French gatherings brought together a broad coalition.
Some came from the political right and far-right: there were
well-heeled Catholics from posh parts of Paris, poorer ones from the
provinces and some Muslims. Some supporters even spoke the language of
the anti-capitalist left, arguing that gay adoptions and surrogacy might
lead to a heartless market in embryos. To some extent, the movement
simply capitalised on the general unpopularity of François Hollande,
then the Socialist president.
Germany, too, has seen street demonstrations in imitation of the French ones, under an identical banner, Demo für Alle.
As in France, the rallies have received discreet encouragement from
politicians and clerics. But the German assemblies (focused in
particular on moves to liberalise education about sex and gender) have
been smaller, and they have drawn counter-demonstrations. It is still
possible that same-sex marriage will be contested in Germany, on grounds
that it violates the constitution. But the argument will be conducted
in the courts, not on the streets.
This Franco-German
contrast seems paradoxical. Although each country comprises a wide
spectrum of opinion, German social norms are in some ways more
conservative than French ones. (Take the issue of abortion. Although
both countries have quite liberal regimes for terminating a pregnancy up
to 12 weeks, the German one lays down that women must have
counselling—in which they are told that fetuses have rights—before
undergoing the procedure. That would be hard to imagine in France.)
Some
reasons for the French-German difference are clear enough. Any popular
street movement that shades into the far-right feels toxic in Germany,
more so than in France, for the obvious historical reasons.
The differences in how social conservatism manifests in both countries are interesting, but my broader point (admittedly made from afar and without direct knowledge of how conservative spokespersons present in the media there) is that it seems to appear in not only a more aggressive, but also a more articulate and less embarrassing form, over there than it does here.
I should make allowance for the lack of direct knowledge, and as
this article makes clear, France on the issue was politically in its own peculiar world. But I still get the feeling that I am onto something here.
For me, of course, (but really, how can any intelligent person disagree?) a key reason why I can't respect the social conservatives here more broadly is the stupidity with which they follow the lead of those in the US who are determined to disbelieve in climate change and resist a sensible economic response to it. If you can't be sensible on that matter, how can you be seen to be sensible on anything?
And it's true - the "no" case here is being largely built on overblown moral panic over things like Safe School program, and the current over-reaction in Anglo culture towards uncritical acceptance of what anyone says (at any age) is their "true" gender.
Much of the French pushback, based more directly on not wanting the government to be endorsing a move away from the natural order of children preferentially being raised by their genetic parents, is a much more solid ground on which to question same sex marriage; yet it seems to me that the "no" case here handles that poorly too.
First, they are on a hiding to nothing by claiming that kids growing up in gay households
per se are going to do worse than kids from straight relationships. Most gay households using surrogacy or insemination to make kids are going to be middle class and well educated, and will have deliberately planned the pregnancy. Of course, they are going to look like their families are doing fine, for now. And those gay families who have kids from their failed straight marriages - of course they should be able to raise kids too, and in most of those cases, the children are still going to know and spend time with their biological parents.
But none of that means that conservatives should not be able to mount a reasoned case that the matter of making same sex marriage the same as heterosexual marriage reads as endorsement for "anything goes" as far as reproduction is concerned.
It is a difficult argument to make, however, unless you are going to out on a limb against modern standards as to what heterosexual couples may do to make a baby too. I personally don't have a problem with doing that - I think that surrogacy for anyone is a bad idea, and I find it remarkable that those on the progressive side make no acknowledgement at all that what they think is clearly reasonable in reproductive matters is demonstrably something about which opinion can change against them - the prime example being the idea that protecting the anonymity of sperm donors was something a government should do, to a complete reversal once those kids as adults questioned what politicians thought was "obvious" only two or three decades ago.
Anyway, my point is that we need a better class of conservative here - ours are an unimpressive lot who are doomed to failure on nearly all social issues.